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dc.contributores-ES
dc.creatorEnríquez Canto, Yordanis
dc.date2018-06-08
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-11T13:21:11Z
dc.date.available2018-12-11T13:21:11Z
dc.identifierhttps://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/rlbi/article/view/3137
dc.identifier10.18359/rlbi.3137
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10654/19678
dc.descriptionAlgunos enfoques bioéticos consideran central la racionalidad en la noción de persona. Jeff McMahan supedita la condición personal a las capacidades cognitivas, de consecuencia quien presenta discapacidad intelectual no es considerado persona. La noción de persona es central en la Bioética general y medular en la fundamentación de tratados y convenciones. El modelo considerado influye en la bioética clínica ya que la práctica biomédica deduce normas a partir de reflexiones teóricas. El artículo examina el criterio de las capacidades cognitivas para determinar la condición personal en la discapacidad intelectual empleando la crítica a la teoría ideal. A tal fin, se parte de las críticas a la teoría ideal identificando problemas en la idealización de capacidades. Posteriormente se describe la discapacidad intelectual y cómo esta es contrastada por las conceptualizaciones de Jeff McMahan. Seguidamente se realiza un análisis de cuatro limitaciones del criterio de las capacidades cognitivas para establecer la condición personal. Por último, se argumenta que la corporeidad complementa los modelos que en Bioética describen la persona humana. El criterio de las capacidades cognitivas no debe considerarse normativo puesto que la corporeidad condiciona la pérdida de nuestras capacidades y expone a la discapacidad misma.es-ES
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dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad Militar Nueva Granadaes-ES
dc.relationhttps://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/rlbi/article/view/3137/2900
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dc.rightsCopyright (c) 2018 Revista Latinoamericana de Bioéticaes-ES
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0es-ES
dc.sourceRevista Latinoamericana de Bioética; Vol. 18, Núm. 35-2 (2018): PRE-PUBLICACIÓN 2018-2es-ES
dc.source2462-859X
dc.source1657-4702
dc.subjectBioéticaes-ES
dc.subjectdiscapacidad intelectual; personas con discapacidad intelectual; cognición; cuerpo humanoes-ES
dc.titleEstatus personal en la discapacidad intelectual: considerando las capacidades cognitivases-ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.typees-ES


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