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dc.contributor.authorHerrera Saavedra, Juan Pablo
dc.contributor.authorCantor Vargas, Natalia
dc.contributor.authorLis Gutiérrez, Jenny Paola
dc.contributor.authorCampo Robledo, Jacobo Alberto
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-08T19:27:08Z
dc.date.available2020-01-08T19:27:08Z
dc.date.issued2013-12-31
dc.identifierhttps://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/rfce/article/view/640
dc.identifier10.18359/rfce.640
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10654/33822
dc.descriptionThis paper shows the implementation of a second level price differentiation of industrial property price, in particular the multi-class system, this is because Colombia’s accession to Madrid’s Protocol in 2011. The methodology is based on a model to establish an optimal trademark price structure with two objectives: (i) to accomplish commitments under the TLT and encourage the use of multi-class system, and (ii) to identify a mechanism to reduce negative effects, which in terms of collection could face industrial property authority, based on the agreement in force. Among main findings, the inverse unequivocal existence between price and number of requests was identified, considering multiple factors that can affect the demand trademark service. Additionally, it was established that this differentiated price system leveraged the decrease on revenues from the industrial property management authority in Colombia given the observed demand service characteristics.eng
dc.descriptionEste documento presenta una aplicación de discriminación de segundo grado a las tarifas de propiedad industrial, en particular al sistema multi-clase, esto a propósito de la adhesión de Colombia al Protocolo de Madrid en 2011. La metodología consistió en la construcción de un modelo para establecer una estructura tarifaria óptima de registro de marcas con dos objetivos: (i) cumplir con las obligaciones dispuestas en el TLT e incentivar la utilización del sistema multi-clase, y (ii) identificar un mecanismo que minimizara los efectos negativos, que en materia de recaudo podría enfrentar la autoridad de propiedad industrial, con la entrada en vigencia de dicho acuerdo. Dentro de los principales hallazgos del estudio se identificó la no existencia inequívoca inversa entre tarifa marcaria y número de solicitudes, lo que da espacio a considerar múltiples factores que pueden incidir en la demanda del servicio de registros marcarios distintos a su precio. Igualmente, se estableció que este sistema de tarifas diferenciadas amortiguó el descenso de los ingresos de la autoridad administradora de propiedad industrial en Colombia dadas las características de la demanda del servicio observado.spa
dc.descriptionEste documento apresenta uma aplicação de discriminação de segundo grau às tarifas de propriedade industrial, em particular ao sistema multiclasse, isto a propósito da adesão da Colômbia ao Protocolo de Madri em 2011. A metodologia consistiu na construção de um modelo para estabelecer uma estrutura tarifária ótima de registo de marcas com dois objetivos: (i) cumprir com as obrigações dispostas no TLT e incentivar a utilização do sistema multiclasse, e (ii) identificar um mecanismo que minimizasse os efeitos negativos que poderia enfrentar a autoridade de propriedade industrial em matéria de arrecadação, com a entrada em vigência de dito acordo. Dentro dos principais resultados do estudo se identificou a não existência inequívoca inversa entre tarifa de marca e número de solicitações, o que dá espaço a considerar múltiplos fatores que podem incidir na demanda do serviço de registos de marcas diferentes a seu preço. Igualmente, se estabeleceu que este sistema de tarifas diferenciadas amorteceu o descenso dos rendimentos da autoridade administradora de propriedade industrial na Colômbia dadas as características da demanda do serviço observado.por
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisherUniversidad Militar Nueva Granadaspa
dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2016 Revista Facultad de Ciencias Económicasspa
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0spa
dc.sourceRevista Facultad de Ciencias Económicas; Vol. 22 Núm. 1 (2014); 63-78spa
dc.source1909-7719
dc.source0121-6805
dc.titleSecond level price differentiation: case of multiclass price for trademark registry in Colombiaeng
dc.titleDiscriminación de precios de segundo grado: el caso de tarifas multi-clase para el registro marcario en Colombiaspa
dc.titleDiscriminação de preços de segundo grau: o caso das tarifas multiclasse para o registo de marcas na Colômbiapor
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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dc.subject.proposalTrademark Law Treaty (TLT)eng
dc.subject.proposalSecond level differentiationeng
dc.subject.proposalIndustrial propertyeng
dc.subject.proposalMadrid Protocoleng
dc.subject.proposalTrademarks.eng
dc.subject.proposalTratado sobre derecho de marcas (TLT)spa
dc.subject.proposalDiscriminación de segundo gradospa
dc.subject.proposalPropiedad industrialspa
dc.subject.proposalProtocolo de Madridspa
dc.subject.proposalMarcas.spa
dc.subject.proposalTratado sobre direito de marcas (TLT)por
dc.subject.proposalDiscriminação de segundo graupor
dc.subject.proposalPropriedade industrialpor
dc.subject.proposalProtocolo de Madripor
dc.subject.proposalMarcas.por


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