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dc.contributor.authorGonzález Segovia, Octavio
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-08T19:42:10Z
dc.date.available2020-01-08T19:42:10Z
dc.date.issued2016-01-05
dc.identifierhttp://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/ries/article/view/1364
dc.identifier10.18359/ries.1364
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10654/34700
dc.descriptionI depart from the assumption that states purposefully choose between different institutional arrangements, because they regard one or the other as more convenient for dealing with new conditions or new problems. In the case of the biosecurity domain, I argue that the choice is restricted to two institutional arrangements: transgovernmental networks (TGNs) or intergovernmental organizations. I also maintain that under certain conditions actors deliberately opt for TGNs because they consider them as superior institutional arrangements. Although states continue to rely on formal treaties to govern security cooperation, these have been increasingly complemented by a variety of TGNs. Owing to their flexibility, speed and low sovereignty costs, many anticipate that TGNs will be the preferred channel for international cooperation by performing many global governance functions but without having the form of more structured organizations. Hence, the aim of this paper is to evaluate the literature on transgovernmental networks, legalization and rational institutional design by intertwining and applying some of their theories to the biosecurity issue-area. Finally, I conclude by discussing two possible rival explanations to the rationalist approach.eng
dc.descriptionParto del supuesto de que los Estados eligen conscientemente entre diferentes arreglos institucionales porque consideran que unos son más convenientes que otros para enfrentar nuevos problemas o condiciones. En el campo de la bioseguridad arguyo que la elección está confinada a dos tipos de organizaciones: redes transgubernamentales (RTG) y organizaciones intergubernamentales. Asimismo, sostengo que bajo determinadas condiciones los actores deliberadamente optan por las RTG debido a que las califican como arreglos institucionales superiores. A pesar de que los Estados continúan dependiendo de los tratados formales para dirigir la cooperación en seguridad, muchos de éstos han sido complementados por una variedad de RTG. Debido a su flexibilidad, rapidez y bajos costos en materia de soberanía, muchos anticipan que las RTG serán el vehículo preferido para llevar a cabo la cooperación internacional al desempeñar muchas funciones de gobernanza global pero sin tener la forma de las organizaciones más estructuradas. De ahí, que el objetivo de este ensayo sea evaluar la literatura enfocada en las redes transgubernamentales, legalización y diseño institucional racional, así como conjugar y aplicar algunas de sus teorías al área de la bioseguridad. Por último, discuto dos posibles explicaciones rivales al enfoque racionalista.spa
dc.descriptionParto da suposição de que os Estados escolhem conscientemente dentre diferentes modelos institucionais, pois consideram que uns são mais convenientes do que outros para enfrentar novos problemas ou condições. No campo da biossegurança, defendo que a escolha está confinada a dois tipos de organizações: redes transgovernamentais (RTG) e organizações intergovernamentais. Também sustento que, deliberadamente e sob certas determinadas condições, os envolvidos optam pelas RTG, por as classificarem como modelos institucionais superiores. Apesar dos Estados continuarem dependendo dos acordos formais para conduzir a cooperação de segurança, muitos deles foram complementados por diversas RTG. Devido a sua flexibilidade, rapidez e baixos custos em relação a soberania, muitos antecipam que as RTG serão o caminho preferido para levar a cabo a cooperação internacional ao desempenhar muitas funções de governança Global, mas sem ter a forma das organizações mais estruturadas. A partir daí, o objetivo desse ensaio é avaliar a literatura focada nas redes transgovernamentais, legalização e modelo institucional racional, assim como combinar e aplicar algumas de suas teorias na área da biossegurança. Por fim, discuto duas possíveis explicações antagônicas na abordagem racionalista.por
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formatapplication/xml
dc.language.isoeng
dc.language.isospa
dc.publisherUniversidad Militar Nueva Granadaspa
dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2016 De Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridadspa
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0spa
dc.sourceRevista Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad; Vol 11 No 1 (2016): Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad; 21-43eng
dc.sourceRevista Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad; Vol. 11 Núm. 1 (2016): Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad; 21-43spa
dc.source1909-7743
dc.source1909-3063
dc.titleWhen are transgovernmental networks the best option to deal with Biosecurity threats? a state of the art revieweng
dc.title¿Cuándo las redes transgubernamentales son la mejor opción para tratar amenazas en Bioseguridad? una revisión del estado de la cuestiónspa
dc.titleQuando as redes transgovernamentais são a melhor opção para discorrer ameaças de biossegurança? uma revisão do estado da questãopor
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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dc.subject.proposalBiosecurityeng
dc.subject.proposalGHSIeng
dc.subject.proposalglobal health governanceeng
dc.subject.proposalG7eng
dc.subject.proposalG20eng
dc.subject.proposalinstitutional designeng
dc.subject.proposalintergovernmental organizationseng
dc.subject.proposalrational choiceeng
dc.subject.proposaltransgovernmental networkseng
dc.subject.proposalBioseguridadspa
dc.subject.proposaldiseño institucionalspa
dc.subject.proposalelección racionalspa
dc.subject.proposalGHSIspa
dc.subject.proposalG7spa
dc.subject.proposalG20spa
dc.subject.proposalgobernanza global de la saludspa
dc.subject.proposalorganizaciones intergubernamentalesspa
dc.subject.proposalredes transgubernamentalesspa
dc.subject.proposalBiossegurançapor
dc.subject.proposalmodelo institucionalpor
dc.subject.proposalescolha racionalpor
dc.subject.proposalGHSIpor
dc.subject.proposalG7por
dc.subject.proposalG20por
dc.subject.proposalgovernança global da saúdepor
dc.subject.proposalorganizações intergovernamentaispor
dc.subject.proposalredes transgovernamentaipor


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