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dc.contributor.authorArratia Sandoval, Estebanspa
dc.contributor.authorGarrido Quiroz, Aldospa
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-08T19:47:00Z
dc.date.available2020-01-08T19:47:00Z
dc.date.issued2019-02-08
dc.identifierhttp://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/ries/article/view/3610
dc.identifier10.18359/ries.3610
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10654/34794
dc.descriptionDuring his election campaign, the new president of Mexico, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador proposed to grant amnesty to those involved in drug production and trafficking in order to finish the War on drugs, moving between taboo and pragmatism. Undoubtedly, this initiative is a radical change from the state approach to this conflict because it considers a classic tools of peace process, such as, demobilization, reintegration and transitional justice. However, what are the main risks of supply? This reflection article aims to answer this question, analyzing, under a qualitative approach, the main constraints faced by this proposal. The main conclusion is that amnesty is only containment damage strategy since it doesn't seek to modify the scale of the illicit market, but model their behavior: low profile, without a position of open confrontation and moderate levels of lethality.eng
dc.descriptionDurante su campaña electoral, el nuevo presidente de México, Andrés Manuel López Obrador propuso otorgarles una amnistía a personas involucradas en la producción y tráfico de drogas con el objetivo de finalizar la Guerra contra el narcotráfico, moviéndose así entre el tabú y pragmatismo. Sin duda, esta iniciativa constituye un cambio radical respecto a la aproximación del Estado a este conflicto armado pues considera herramientas clásicas de un proceso de paz, tales como desmovilización, reintegración y justicia transicional. Sin embargo, ¿cuáles son los principales riesgos que conlleva la oferta? Este artículo de reflexión tiene como objetivo responder a dicha interrogante, analizando, bajo un enfoque cualitativo, las principales limitaciones que enfrenta esta propuesta. La principal conclusión es que la amnistía constituye sólo una estrategia de contención de daños dado que no busca modificar la escala del mercado ilícito, sino modelar su comportamiento: bajo perfil, sin una posición de abierta confrontación y con niveles moderados de letalidad.spa
dc.formatapplication/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherUniversidad Militar Nueva Granadaspa
dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2019 Revista Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridadspa
dc.rightshttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0spa
dc.sourceRevista Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad; Vol 14 No 1 (2019): Versión preliminareng
dc.sourceRevista Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad; Vol. 14 Núm. 1 (2019): Versión preliminarspa
dc.source1909-7743
dc.source1909-3063
dc.titleThe Lopez Obrador's dilemma faces drug traffickingeng
dc.title¿Tabú o pragmatismo? El dilema de López Obrador frente al narcotráficospa
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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dc.subject.proposalArmed conflicteng
dc.subject.proposalcriminal agendaseng
dc.subject.proposalmexicoeng
dc.subject.proposalpeace processeseng
dc.subject.proposalwar on drugseng
dc.subject.proposalAgendas criminalesspa
dc.subject.proposalconflicto armadospa
dc.subject.proposalguerra contra el narcotráficospa
dc.subject.proposalméxicospa
dc.subject.proposalprocesos de pazspa


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