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Poder militar y disuasión convencional: revisión de la literatura

dc.creatorDall'Agnol, Augusto C.
dc.creatorE. Duarte, Érico
dc.date2022-06-30
dc.date.accessioned2023-03-22T19:13:00Z
dc.date.available2023-03-22T19:13:00Z
dc.identifierhttps://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/ries/article/view/5793
dc.identifier10.18359/ries.5793
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10654/43592
dc.descriptionThis literature review explains how strategies of deterrence and compellence relate to military power. Such an inquiry is relevant as much of the literature on military power diffusion focuses exclusively on military platforms and weapons systems. Hence, we advance a more political and strategic approach rather than a more technological approach while assessing military power. The article uses “costs” and “probability of success” to assess conventional deterrence. Although both compellence and deterrence are coercive strategies, they have different implications for the diffusion of military power, especially because of the costs associated with each one. We argue that countries should not replicate or pursue a carbon copy of all the top platforms and advanced weapons systems of a leading state to catch up or to deny the advantages of technological innovation. Hence, denial strategies are much cheaper than control strategies. Finally, denial strategies often result in a decrease in the probability of success in the battlefield of an expeditionary force offensive. The review concludes that military power should relate much more to deterrence than compellence, countering the conventional Dahl’s notion that power is the ability of “A” to cause “B” to do something that “B” otherwise would not do. In other words, military power must be seen as “A” convincing “B” not to initiate a specific action because the perceived benefits to “B” do not justify the potential costs and risks.en-US
dc.descriptionEsta revisión de la literatura explica la forma en que las estrategias de disuasión y coacción (compellence) se relacionan con el poder militar. Tal investigación es pertinente, puesto que gran parte de la literatura sobre la difusión del poder militar se centra exclusivamente en las plataformas militares y en los sistemas de armas. Por lo tanto, se promueve un enfoque más político y estratégico en lugar de un enfoque más tecnológico al evaluar el poder militar. En el artículo, se utiliza “costos” y “probabilidad de éxito” para evaluar la disuasión convencional. Aunque tanto la coacción como la disuasión son estrategias coercitivas, tienen diferentes implicaciones para la difusión del poder militar, en especial por los costos asociados a cada una. También se argumenta que los países no deberían replicar o copiar todas las plataformas principales y sistemas de armas avanzados de un estado líder para actualizarse o negar las ventajas de la innovación tecnológica. En consecuencia, las estrategias de negación son mucho más económicas que las estrategias de control. Por último, las estrategias de negación a menudo disminuyen la probabilidad de éxito en el campo de batalla de una ofensiva de la fuerza expedicionaria. Se concluye que el poder militar debe relacionarse mucho más con la disuasión que con la coacción para contrarrestar la noción convencional de Dahl de que el poder es la capacidad de “A” para hacer que “B” haga algo que “B” de otro modo no haría. En otras palabras, el poder militar debe verse como “A” convenciendo a “B” de no iniciar una acción específica porque los beneficios percibidos para “B” no justifican los costos y riesgos potenciales.es-ES
dc.descriptionEsta revisão de literatura explica como as estratégias de dissuasão e compulsão se relacionam com o poder militar. Tal investigação é relevante, pois grande parte da literatura sobre difusão de poder militar se concentra exclusivamente em plataformas militares e sistemas de armas. Assim, avançamos uma abordagem mais política e estratégica em vez de uma abordagem mais tecnológica ao avaliar o poder militar. O artigo usa “custos” e “probabilidade de sucesso” para avaliar a dissuasão convencional. Embora tanto a compulsão quanto a dissuasão sejam estratégias coercitivas, elas têm implicações diferentes para a difusão do poder militar, especialmente pelos custos associados a cada uma delas. Argumentamos que os países não devem replicar ou buscar uma cópia carbono de todas as principais plataformas e sistemas avançados de armas de um estado líder para recuperar o atraso ou negar as vantagens da inovação tecnológica. Assim, as estratégias de negação são muito mais baratas do que as estratégias de controle. Finalmente, as estratégias de negação muitas vezes resultam em uma diminuição na probabilidade de sucesso no campo de batalha de uma ofensiva de força expedicionária. A revisão conclui que o poder militar deve se relacionar muito mais à dissuasão do que à compulsão, contrariando a noção convencional de Dahl de que poder é a capacidade de “A” de fazer “B” fazer algo que “B” de outra forma não faria. Em outras palavras, o poder militar deve ser visto como “A” convencendo “B” a não iniciar uma ação específica porque os benefícios percebidos para “B” não justificam os custos e riscos potenciais.pt-BR
dc.formatapplication/pdf
dc.formattext/xml
dc.languageeng
dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad Militar Nueva Granadaes-ES
dc.relationhttps://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/ries/article/view/5793/5163
dc.relationhttps://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/ries/article/view/5793/5323
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dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2022 Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridades-ES
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0es-ES
dc.sourceRevista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad; Vol. 17 No. 1 (2022); 101-118en-US
dc.sourceRevista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad; Vol. 17 Núm. 1 (2022); 101-118es-ES
dc.sourceRevista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad; v. 17 n. 1 (2022); 101-118pt-BR
dc.source1909-7743
dc.source1909-3063
dc.titleMilitary Power and Conventional Deterrence: A Literature Reviewen-US
dc.titlePoder militar y disuasión convencional: revisión de la literaturaes-ES
dc.titlePoder Militar e Dissuasão Convencional: Uma Revisão da Literaturapt-BR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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