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La guerra de Georgia de 2008 y el proceso de transformación del Ejército Ruso

dc.creatorBotafogo de Oliveira, Fernando
dc.date2022-06-30
dc.date.accessioned2023-03-22T19:13:00Z
dc.date.available2023-03-22T19:13:00Z
dc.identifierhttps://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/ries/article/view/5824
dc.identifier10.18359/ries.5824
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10654/43593
dc.descriptionThe campaign carried out in 2008 by the Russian Army in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in Georgia, aimed to annex these two regions with the strategic aim of forming a containment zone for the involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in issues from the Middle East. The assessment that Russian authorities made after the conflict pointed to a possibility of transforming the military capabilities of the Russian Army. Three key issues were identified: weapons technology, information and communication technologies, and the force structure employed in the Georgia campaign. Thus, this article focuses on an analysis of these key issues as well as the background that made the Russian authorities realize their army’s transformation needs. Therefore, we make use  of a qualitative research grounded in a literature review between 2008 and 2014, and consultation of primary documents related to Russian defense and security during these years.en-US
dc.descriptionla campaña llevada a cabo en 2008 por el Ejército Ruso en las regiones de Abjasia y Osetia del Sur, en Georgia, tuvo como objetivo la anexión de estas dos regiones con el objetivo estratégico de constituir una zona de contención para la implicación de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN) en cuestiones de Oriente Medio. La valoración que hicieron las autoridades rusas tras el conflicto apuntaba a una posibilidad de transformación de las capacidades militares del Ejército Ruso. Se identificaron tres temas clave: tecnología de armas, tecnologías de información y comunicación y la estructura de fuerza empleada en la campaña de Georgia. Por lo tanto, el artículo se centra en un análisis de estos temas clave, así como los antecedentes que hicieron que las autoridades rusas se dieran cuenta de las necesidades de transformación de su ejército. Por tanto, se utiliza una investigación cualitativa basada en una revisión bibliográfica entre 2008 y 2014, además de la consulta de documentos primarios relacionados con la defensa y la seguridad rusas durante estos años.es-ES
dc.descriptiona campanha realizada em 2008 pelo Exército Russo nas regiões da Abecásia e da Ossétia do Sul, na Geórgia, visavam anexar essas duas regiões com o intuito estratégico de formar uma zona de contenção ao envolvimento da Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (Otan) em questões do Oriente Médio. A avaliação que as autoridades russas fizeram após o conflito apontava para uma possibilidade de transformar as capacidades militares do Exército Russo. Foram identificados três quesitos-chaves: tecnologia de armamentos, tecnologias de informação e comunicação, e estrutura de força empregada na campanha da Geórgia. Dessa forma, este artigo concentra-se em uma análise desses quesitos-chave bem como dos antecedentes que fizeram as autoridades russas perceberem as necessidades de transformação do seu exército. Para tanto, utiliza-se de uma pesquisa qualitativa alicerçada em uma revisão bibliográfica entre 2008 e 2014, além da consulta de documentos primários relacionados à defesa e segurança da Rússia durante esses anos.pt-BR
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dc.languagespa
dc.publisherUniversidad Militar Nueva Granadaes-ES
dc.relationhttps://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/ries/article/view/5824/5165
dc.relationhttps://revistas.unimilitar.edu.co/index.php/ries/article/view/5824/5325
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dc.rightsDerechos de autor 2022 Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridades-ES
dc.rightshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0es-ES
dc.sourceRevista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad; Vol. 17 No. 1 (2022); 135-154en-US
dc.sourceRevista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad; Vol. 17 Núm. 1 (2022); 135-154es-ES
dc.sourceRevista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad; v. 17 n. 1 (2022); 135-154pt-BR
dc.source1909-7743
dc.source1909-3063
dc.titleThe Georgian War of 2008 and the Russian Army Transformation Processen-US
dc.titleLa guerra de Georgia de 2008 y el proceso de transformación del Ejército Rusoes-ES
dc.titleA Guerra da Geórgia de 2008 e o processo de transformação do Exército Russopt-BR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion


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